The "repressive hypothesis" vs. "sexuality"

Thought it might be useful, seeing as Foucault is to be a foundational text for the course, if I defined some of the recurring terms and things I ought to remember for later, so here goes!

So! The repressive hypothesis, then. This is NOT what Foucault believes, but rather a theory which explains the history of sexuality (since the 18th century) as one of repression. In theory, since the rise of the bourgeoisie, 1) energy spent on purely pleasurable activities is disapproved of, and 2) sex is something private/practical and meant to be between a husband and wife. Sex outside of this construct is "repressed," and so discourse on sexuality is confined to marriage. The theory mandates that, if we are to free ourselves from this sexual repression, we must talk freely and openly about (as well as enjoy) sex/our sexuality (and if anyone would like to clear up for me which of those last two terms is appropriate to use here, by all means, let's have it then).

Here is also probably a good time to explain WHY Foucault doesn't agree with the repressive hypothesis. More discourse isn't needed regarding sex because sex has practically BECOME discourse; we've gone on about it for so long that we've effectively regulated a vast multitude of its many aspects. What we really need to do is bin all the discourse and everything related to "sex" as an ideal if we're going to rebel, NOT talk about sex more (as the repressive hypothesis would suggest), and focus on the body and pleasure (whatever that means).

SO. Sexuality isn't what makes us what we are or what defines us in any way - it's a social construct that (to some extent) controls us (which is sort of a given, seeing that's it's part of "power" - specifically, it's a huge part of what controls our society). Once again: Sexuality is not what we are. Mind you, sexuality IS, according to Foucault, historical fact - part V tells us as much (because "sex" is the platonic ideal, which is a bit of a puzzlement, while sexuality is real in that it's been a component of power for some time now). Sexuality is very much something that exists, but it exists not as some aspect of what or who we are but rather as a (factual and very real) political construct. And it's this political construct that becomes part of biopower/biopolitics (but more on that later).

This is, I think, where we get into the "right to kill"/"power over life" thing going on. If I'm going to be really simplistic about this, the idea of blood in relation to power (pre-18th century) falls under "right to kill," while sexuality as a power construct falls under "power over life." So sexuality isn't what makes us what we are at all, but rather a social construct that (to some extent) controls us. And it's more or less omnipresent, judging by what we talked about in class on Monday.

Right then. I've beat it into my head by now that sexuality is a social and political construct that (at least in part) regulates our modern society. Fantastic. Now sexuality is part of biopower/biopolitics, or else Foucault probably wouldn't be talking about it in this text. And part V of the text is pretty explicit that sexuality has "power over life." Does that mean biopolitics by definition is the practice of controlling society through biopower?

I'm going to have to come back to that. I want to wrap up the post by doing a bit of a versus match-up: the "repressive hypothesis" as a power construct versus "sexuality."

The repressive hypothesis, I think, falls under the "right to kill" school of thought. Everything under this hypothesis is supposed to deal with the heterosexual married couple as a means for self-preservation and continued existence. If "perversions" are a threat, then they must be repressed ("killed") except that doesn't really work. It's like trying to commit genocide, i.e. impossible. "Take life"/"let live" is a very narrow form of control and it doesn't work in the complex modern century (fun fact: we're no longer a feudal society).

So sexuality, then, is a similar power but much more complex, and it regulates everything through discourse rather than repression ("killing"). Sexuality is not, then, our essence, but rather a social construct through which we are controlled.

Perhaps by "sexuality" I am really referring to "biopower" (or at least a component of biopower)? Sexuality is still technically a part of the repressive hypothesis, so in employing the term "sexuality" to describe Foucault's rejection of the repressive hypothesis in favor of this other philosophy, I am using the term in a very particular way, and maybe one that is unfair. Thoughts, anyone?